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Institutions and labour market outcomes in the EU – A Social Model 
Employment Efficiency and Income Distribution Index 
Michael Knogler and Fidelis Lankes 
Labour market performance as measured by employment rates and inequality of income distribution show 
significant differences among EU countries. In 2014 the variation in employment rates was between 48.8% in 
Greece and 74.4% in Sweden. Inequality in income distribution as measured by S80/S20 income quintile share ratio 
ranges in 2013 from 3.4 in Czech Republic to 6.6 in Bulgaria, Romania and Greece and has risen especially in 
Southeast European countries during the last years. To some extent, labour market and social institutions may 
account for these differences. Implemented social models in Europe differ from each other by different combinations 
of policies and institutions showing the dimensions of social models. We use these dimensions to develop two 
indices which capture the employment and income distribution efficiency of social models i.e. shows how institutions 
impact on employment and income distribution. Both indices can be used to rank and compare the institutional 
quality of social models across EU countries. 
Employment and income distribution patterns and 
Institutions 
Despite some progress during the second half of the 
1990s and the first half of 2000s, labour market perfor-
mance in the EU has been rather week. Employment 
rates admittedly rose and unemployment rates sunk till 
2008, but during the crisis period beginning with 2008, 
unemployment rate in the EU sharply rose and was at 
10.4% in 2014. Employment rates are at 64.8% in the 
EU28 and below the Lisbon goal (70 percent) (Europe-
an Commission, 2014). 
However, the overall trends in the EU conceal significant 
differences in labour market outcomes among EU Coun-
tries. Although employment rates in most countries are 
recently (2014) higher than 1995, the difference in em-
ployment rates between the country with the highest em-
ployment rate and the country with the lowest employment 
was largely constant with more than 27 percentage points 
in 1995 (Denmark: 73.9; Spain: 46.8) and almost 26 per-
centage points in 2014 when the variation was between 
48.8% in Greece and 74.4% in Sweden (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Employment rate, 1995–2014 
The low employment and growth performance over the 
recent decades in the EU has increased concerns re-
garding an increasing wage dispersion, income inequal-
ity and social exclusion. Different indicators show evi-
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dence that income inequality has increased significantly 
since the mid-1980s, and the Euro area debt crisis to-
gether with fiscal consolidation programmes adopted by 
several EU countries could worsen the situation in the 
short and medium run. Inequality in income distribution 
as measured by S80/S20 income quintile share ratio 
ranges in 2013 from 3.4 in Czech Republic to 6.6 in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Greece and has risen especially 
in Southeast European countries during the last years 
(Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Income inequality. S80 / S20 income quintile 
ratio* 2007 / 2013 
 
 
To some extent labour market institutions may account for 
these differences. There is a long-standing literature relat-
ing labour market outcomes to labour market institutions 
(for a broad review of the literature see Boeri and Van 
Ours (2008), brief summaries in Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (2005, p. XIII–XXXIX) and Blanchard (2006), 
among others). Most researchers have focused on the 
relationship between institutions and unemployment. 
Some authors have also reported evidence on the link 
between institutions and employment (see Nickell (1997) 
and EU Commission (2004), and Bassanini and Duval 
(2006), among others). More recently, the focus of labour 
economists has shifted to interactions between different 
labour market institutions (Coe and Snower, 1997, Belot 
and van Ours 2001, Bassanini and Duval 2009). Labour 
market institutions have complementary effects on labour 
market outcomes, which are indicative for broad reform 
packages, rather than changes in a single institutional 
variable. Interactions between institutions triggered the 
analysis of economic systems or social models, which can 
be identified to prevailing combinations of policies and 
institutions across countries (Knogler and Lankes, 2012). 
 
Data and Methodology 
The central idea of the indices is to assess the extent to 
which European countries dispose of the institutional 
quality to achieve high levels of employment and social 
cohesion. Labour market and social policy institutions 
can be described by a potentially vast number of empir-
ical indicators. The guiding principle for our selection of 
indicators is the hypothesis that social models reflect 
the main tasks of labour and social policy to varying 
degrees, that is, reduction of poverty and income ine-
qualities, protection against insurable labour market 
risk, and increase of rewards from labour market partic-
ipation (Boeri, 2002). In detail, eleven indicators which 
are essentially exogenous to the economic outcome 
(employment rates, income inequality etc.) were includ-
ed. All these indicators taken mostly from Eurostat and 
World-Bank sources characterize policy or institutional 
features chosen in order to reflect the main tasks of 
social and labour market policy (table 1). 
 
Table 1: Social policy indicators 
Indicator Description and Source 
Mean years  
of schooling 
(males aged 25 
years and 
above)  
(years) 
 
Average number of years of education received by people 
ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels 
using official durations of each level. 
Source: Barro and Lee (2013), UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
(2013b) and HDRO estimates based on data on educational 
attainment from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2013b) and on 
methodology from Barro and Lee (2013). http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
content/mean-years-schooling-males-aged-25-years-and-above-
years 
Reduction of  
poverty via  
social transfers 
Quotient of: (i) The share of persons with an equivalised dispos-
able income, before social transfers, below the risk-of-poverty 
threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised 
disposable income (after social transfers). Retirement and 
survivor's pensions are counted as income before transfers and 
not as social transfers. (ii) The share of persons with an 
equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty thresh-
old, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised 
disposable income (after social transfers).  
Source: Eurostat. 
Early leavers 
from education 
and  
training 
This indicator refers to persons aged 18 to 24 fulfilling the 
following two conditions: first, the highest level of education or 
training attained is ISCED 0, 1, 2 or 3c short, second, respond-
ents declared not having received any education or training in 
the four weeks preceding the survey (numerator). The denomi-
nator consists of the total population of the same age group, 
excluding no answers to the questions “highest level of educa-
tion or training attained” and “participation to education and 
training”. Both the numerators and the denominators come from 
the EU Labour Force Survey.  
Source: Eurostat. 
Hiring and firing 
practises 
In your country, how would you characterize the hiring and firing 
of workers? [1 = heavily impeded by regulations; 7 = extremely 
flexible] 
Source: Global competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion Survey. 
Generosity of 
unemployment 
benefits 
Expenditures on passive labour market policy (Category 8 and 9: 
financial assistance that aims to compensate individuals for loss 
of wage or salary and support them during job-search (i.e. 
mostly unemployment benefits) or which facilitates early retire-
ment.) weighted with unemployment ratio.  
Source: Eurostat; Own calculations. 
Expenditures  
on active labour 
market policy 
Expenditures on active labour market policy (Category 2–7: 
interventions that provide temporary support for groups that are 
disadvantaged in the labour market and which aim at activating 
the unemployed, helping people move from involuntary inactivity 
into employment, or maintaining the jobs of persons threatened 
by unemployment) weighted with unemployment ratio.  
Source: Eurostat; Own Calculations. 
Life-long 
learning 
Percentage of the adult population aged 25 to 64 participating in 
education and training: Life-long learning refers to persons aged 
25 to 64 who stated that they received education or training in 
the four weeks preceding the survey (numerator). The denomi-
nator consists of the total population of the same age group, 
excluding those who did not answer to the question 'participation 
to education and training'. Both the numerator and the denomi-
nator come from the EU Labour Force Survey. The information 
collected relates to all education or training whether or not 
relevant to the respondent's current or possible future job.  
Source: Eurostat. 
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Indicator Description and Source 
Expenditures 
for education 
(investments in 
education and 
training) 
Total public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP: 
Generally the public sector funds the education either by bearing 
directly the current and capital expenses of educational institu-
tions (direct expenditure for educational institutions) or by support-
ing students and their families with scholarships and public loans 
as well as by transferring public subsidies for educational activities 
to private firms or non-profit organizations (transfers to private 
households and firms). Both types of transaction together are 
reported as total public expenditure on education.  
Source: Eurostat. 
Flexibility of 
wage determi-
nation 
In your country, how are wages generally set? [1 = by a 
centralized bargaining process; 7 = by each individual compa-
ny] | 2013–14 weighted average 
Source: Global competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion Survey. 
Marginal  
effective tax 
rates 
on employment 
incomes 
This indicator measures the percentage of gross earnings 
which is “taxed away” through higher tax and social security 
contributions and the withdrawal of unemployment and other 
benefits when an unemployed person returns to employment. 
This structural indicator covers single persons without children 
earning, when in work, 67% of the average earnings.  
Source: Eurostat. 
Corruption  
Perception  
Index 
A country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of 
public sector corruption on a scale of 0–100, where 0 means 
that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and a 100 means 
that a country is perceived as very clean. Source: Transparen-
cy International http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/ 
 
The employment efficiency and income distribution index 
is based on a two-step procedure (Knogler and Lankes, 
2015).  
First, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is carried 
out on eleven original social policy indicators in order to 
identify the main dimensions of social models. PCA is a 
multivariate analysis technique that aims to evaluate 
how different variables are associated with each other. 
The variable identification issue (several indicators may 
proxy for the same institution or distinct variables may 
proxy for similar institutions) is addressed by reducing 
the dimensionality of the dataset. This is achieved by 
transforming correlated indicators into the (smallest 
possible) new set of variables (the principal compo-
nents) using the correlation matrix. The obtained com-
ponents are uncorrelated, thus measuring different 
‘statistical dimensions’ in the dataset and addressing 
the problem of multicollinearity of indicators. 
Second, after reducing the dimensionality of the dataset 
by transforming the indicators in three independent 
variables (components), we analyse in a second step 
how many components are relevant in determining 
labour market outcome (employment rate) and income 
distribution (income inequality S80/S20) in EU coun-
tries. Therefore we compute the weights for the compo-
nents by a regression of the three components on the 
employment rate and the income inequality, respective-
ly. In order to account for the fact, that institutions are 
seen to lead labour market performance, we use three-
year lags of the indicators. The advantage of this pro-
cedure is that a component that is more important for 
employment/income inequality gets a higher weight 
then a component that is not important. In contrast to 
indices that weight variables ex ante by assigning iden-
tical or arbitrary weights, we use PCA and regression 
coefficients to generate an empirically derived weighting 
of indices. 
Social policy dimensions 
The PCA yields three components based on the idea that 
a component should at least explain the variance that is 
contained on average in a single indicator (table 2). Com-
ponent loadings of single indicators are calculated using 
mean values of indicators over five years (2006–2010). 
This ensures that possibly existing annual effects play a 
minor role. 
Based on the component loadings, the actual values of 
individual cases, that is, countries, for the factor scores 
are calculated. The country scores obtained along the 
principal components that account for most of the over-
all variation in the data can then be used for analysing 
how many factors are relevant in determining labour 
market outcome.  
 
Table 2: Principal components analysis of social policy 
indicators 
Component loadings Compo-
nent 1 
Compo-
nent 2 
Compo-
nent 3 
Early leavers from education and training  –x  
Marginal effective tax rate x   
Reduction of the at-risk-of-poverty rate by  
social transfers 
 x  
Life-long learning  x   
Hiring and Firing   x 
Spending on human resources x   
Flexibility of wage determination    x 
Generosity of unemployment benefits x   
Expenditures on active labour market policy x   
Corruption Perception Index x   
Years of schooling  x  
Note: x: loadings > 0.6; Principal component analysis based on correlation matrix with 
varimax rotation. 
 
A first component (accounting for 46.1% of total vari-
ance) can be interpreted as emphasis on labour market 
security. This social model dimension is correlated with 
marginal effective tax rate, expenditures on human re-
sources, life-long learning, generosity of unemployment 
benefits, expenditures on active labour market policy and 
the Corruption Perception Index. Active labour market 
policy and investment in human resources stand for acti-
vation, flexibility and mobility of employees (Flexicurity) 
and increase labour market and income security. In as-
sociation with high unemployment benefits a high em-
phasis on employment security can lead to a high mar-
ginal tax rate. The higher the emphasis on labour market 
security the more is a country perceived as ‘clean’ in 
terms of corruption.  
A second component (accounting for 21.1% of total 
variance) stands for the dimension of social equality. It 
correlates negatively with early school leavers and posi-
tively with the reduction of poverty through social trans-
fers and with years of schooling.  
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A third component (accounting for 11.5% of total vari-
ance) depicts the dimension of labour market flexibility. It 
affects hiring and firing practises and the flexibility of 
wage determination. 
 
Social Model Employment Efficiency Index (SMEE-
Index) 
The result of the principal component and regression 
analysis is one aggregate social model index. The Em-
ployment Efficiency-Index is to show, how social institu-
tions (captured by the dimensions of social models) con-
tribute to employment. Such the higher the value of the 
Index the higher is the employment rate. Therefore, the 
weights for the dimensions are computed with a regres-
sion of the employment rate (average over 2009–2013) 
on the three components. Only those dimensions with 
significant explanatory power (p < 0.05) were retained. 
This procedure resulted in a set of institutional dimen-
sions that is able to explain 56.3 percent of the variation 
in the employment rates. As the influence of the compo-
nent “Labour market flexibility” on the employment rate is 
not significantly different from zero, we ignore “Labour 
market flexibility” by computing the index.  
 
Table 3: SMEE Index 
elms se SMEE-Index Ranking 
dk 2.92 0.28 77.16 1 
se 0.98 0.97 70.04 2 
fi 1.29 0.26 69.85 3 
nl 0.98 0.61 69.26 4 
at 0.87 0.52 68.56 5 
ie 0.54 0.72 67.51 6 
be 0.89 –0.19 67.13 7 
uk 0.14 0.63 65.51 8 
si 0.03 0.81 65.45 9 
de 0.02 0.83 65.43 10 
fr –0.08 0.13 63.49 11 
cz –0.60 1.00 63.01 12 
ee –0.42 0.46 62.70 13 
hu –0.45 0.32 62.22 14 
lt –0.76 0.81 61.92 15 
lv –0.26 –0.33 61.70 16 
pl –0.61 0.38 61.65 17 
es 0.25 –1.73 60.96 18 
pt 0.03 –1.87 59.67 19 
sk –1.52 1.12 59.18 20 
hr –1.38 0.69 58.90 21 
it –0.57 –1.03 58.83 22 
bg –0.95 –0.64 57.97 23 
gr –1.31 –0.42 56.82 24 
ro –1.52 –0.30 56.14 25 
 
Table 3 shows the country scores of the two components 
Emphasis on labour market security (elms) and Social 
equality (se) (column 2 and 3). Column 4 of table 4 dis-
plays the SMEE-Index. 
The Ranking (column 5 of table 4) shows Denmark on 
first position, which has the highest score in emphasis 
on labour market security (elms). The first places in the 
ranking are dominated by countries with high elms but 
differently marked social equality. Slovenia, by far the 
new member country with the highest SMEE index 
score, is in this leading group as well. The Index shows, 
that different combinations of emphasis on labour mar-
ket security and social equality can result in good labour 
market outcomes in terms of employment rate. 
Figure 3 compares the best performer Denmark with 
the lowest ranked country Romania. Characteristic for 
high-ranking countries like Denmark is a high emphasis 
on labour market security as witnessed by the important 
role of active labour market policy, a high level of 
spending on human resources and of lifelong learning 
and low corruption. 
 
Figure 3: Employment Efficiency Index: Best vs. worst 
performer 
 
Social Model Income Distribution Index (SMID-Index) 
The Income Distribution Index shows, how labour mar-
ket and social institutions contribute to income inequali-
ty as measured by S80/S20 income quintile ratio. Such 
the higher the value of the Index the higher is the 
S80/S20 ratio. Therefore we compute the weights for 
the components with a regression of the S80/S20 (av-
erage over 2006–2010) on the three components. As 
with the Employment Efficiency Index, only those com-
ponents with significant explanatory power were re-
tained. The outcome is that all three components are 
significant and explain 67.3 percent of the variation in 
the S80/S20 ratio.  
Table 4 shows the country scores of the components 
(column 2, 3, 4). Column 5 of table 4 displays the SMID-
Index which is calculated according to the formula above. 
The ranking (column 6 of table 4) shows Sweden on first 
position, which has the lowest score in income inequality. 
The first ten places in the ranking are exclusively domi-
nated by countries with relatively high ELMS and simul-
taneously high social equality except for Belgium. Slove-
nia, by far the new member country with the lowest SMID 
Index, is in this leading group as well. The Index shows, 
that different combinations of emphasis on labour market 
security, social equality and labour market flexibility can 
result in low inequality of income distribution. 
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Table 4: SMID Index 
elms se lmf SMID-Index Ranking 
se 0.98 0.97 –0.99 3.29 1 
nl 0.98 0.61 –0.95 3.58 2 
at 0.87 0.52 –0.99 3.69 3 
de 0.02 0.83 –1.24 3.74 4 
si 0.03 0.81 –0.92 3.86 5 
ie 0.54 0.72 –0.14 3.98 6 
fi 1.29 0.26 0.02 4.06 7 
dk 2.92 0.28 2.71 4.28 8 
be 0.89 –0.19 –0.81 4.28 9 
cz –0.60 1.00 0.11 4.36 10 
sk –1.52 1.12 –0.26 4.54 11 
fr –0.08 0.13 –0.40 4.62 12 
lt –0.76 0.81 0.54 4.73 13 
uk 0.14 0.63 1.36 4.77 14 
hr –1.38 0.69 –0.14 4.85 15 
pl –0.61 0.38 0.34 4.92 16 
hu –0.45 0.32 0.83 5.07 17 
ee –0.42 0.46 1.53 5.20 18 
gr –1.31 –0.42 –0.94 5.39 19 
it –0.57 –1.03 –0.83 5.57 20 
lv –0.26 –0.33 1.22 5.63 21 
ro –1.52 –0.30 –0.01 5.73 22 
es 0.25 –1.73 –0.71 5.79 23 
pt 0.03 –1.87 –0.63 6.02 24 
bg –0.95 –0.64 0.91 6.06 25 
 
Figure 4 compares the best performer Sweden with the 
lowest ranked country Bulgaria. High levels of expen-
ditures on human resources and of lifelong learning, low 
corruption, a high poverty reduction through social 
transfers and a relatively rigid labour market regulation 
make the difference.  
 
Figure 4: Income Distribution Index: Best vs. worst 
performer 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
Based on socio-economic indicators reflecting the 
main tasks of social models, a set of institutional vari-
ables that are weighted and combined into two indices 
of institutional quality for European Union Member 
countries is identified. We show that the Index of Em-
ployment Efficiency is able to explain the impact of 
institutional characteristics of European social models 
on employment rates; the Index of Income Distribution 
explains the impact of different institutional combina-
tions on the inequality of income distribution. Both 
indices can be used to analyse and understand the 
differences in employment performance and income 
distribution across European Member countries. 
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